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Abstract
Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) have shown that one-way communication enhances
contributions to public goods. We investigate the eectiveness of one-way commu-
nication, when the benets from the public good are asymmetric and the sender
of a message is the main beneciary of cooperation. Our results show that, in the
absence of communication opportunities, contribution behavior may be inversely
related to other group members' marginal benets from the public good. The ef-
fectiveness of one-way communication, however, remains unaected even though
compliance with a sender's suggestion to cooperate generates unfavorable payo
inequalities for message receivers. The results also indicate that one-way messages
have to relate to the experimental game to enhance cooperation. Merely \giving
someone a voice" is not sucient.
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marginal benet
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In public good provision, the dictate of monetary payo maximization predicts inecient
outcomes for the collective (Olson, 1965). While decades of experimental research demon-
strate the prevalence of social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), a general
willingness to withstand selsh acts is not sucient to resolve the inecient provision of
public goods. Since individual actors' decisions are typically highly interdependent (e.g.,
Fischbacher et al., 2001, Fischbacher and G achter, 2010), successful collective action also
requires a high level of coordination.
In two recent public goods experiments, Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) have shown
that one-way communication, i.e., a free-form text message sent from one group member to
his co-players before contribution decisions are made, can provide the means for successful
coordination. The main facts that have emerged from these experiments are (i) that most
messages entail specic suggestions for ecient contributions and (ii) that participants
generally follow these suggestions. Such one-way communication is a useful simplication
of real world situations in which communication is uni- rather than multilateral. Speeches
as a tool to encourage cooperation when formal authority is lacking are one example. It is
therefore important to identify the circumstances which are conducive to the cooperation-
enhancing eect of one-way communication as well as its underlying mechanisms.
This study reports on a one-shot experiment with asymmetric benets from the public
good. More specically, we consider a situation in which the communicator, i.e., the sender
of a message, is also the main beneciary of cooperation. Apart from its intuitive appeal,
this scenario might challenge the eectiveness of one-way communication if those who send
messages rely on ecient contribution suggestions as witnessed in previous experiments.
Arguably, such prompts are even more likely if communicators benet disproportionally
from cooperation. Compliance with such suggestions, however, might suer for at least
two reasons. One such reason is the inequality in payos associated with an ecient
provision of the public good. Since compliance with any suggestion is voluntary, it is likely
to depend on the desirability of the projected outcome. Inequality averse subjects (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) might thus be less likely to follow prompts
to cooperate when the benets from cooperation are asymmetric. Another reason is that
compliance with contribution suggestions might depend on the recipients' perception of
the sender's intent. Parallel to ndings on direct reciprocity, i.e., responses to actions
(see, e.g., Falk et al., 2008), intentional ambiguity might diminish cooperative responses
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might be perceived as selsh, this is arguably more likely if the sender also benets
disproportionally from the public good.
In his topology of groups, Olson (1965) identied the particular asymmetry in bene-
ts from cooperation, which we described before, in what he called \privileged groups."
Such collectives consist of two types of actors: high-benet group members for whom the
benets from the public good outweigh the costs for providing it and low-benet mem-
bers, for whom the opposite is the case.1 Olson's labeling already signies the argument
that, given actors care only about their own monetary outcome, privileged groups should
enjoy higher quantities of the public good than normal, non-privileged groups since the
latter uniquely consist of low-benet members.2 The only two experiments that explicitly
examined privileged groups are not univocal with respect to this conjecture.3 Gl ockner
et al. (2011) report that the presence of a high-benet member inhibits the cooperation
of low-benet members, although the former makes ecient contributions. As a conse-
quence, privileged and normal groups enjoy similar quantities of the public good. Reuben
and Riedl (2009), in contrast, conrm Olson's conjecture as correct when punishment
opportunities are unavailable. When sanctioning of (mis)behavior is allowed, however,
privileged groups lose their status completely as low-benet members largely refuse to
react to punishment by high-benet members. Reuben and Riedl (2009) thus demon-
strate that the term \privileged" can be misleading when it comes to the eectiveness of
measures against free riding.
This study reports on the rst experiment comparing the eectiveness of one-way
communication in normal vis- a-vis privileged groups.4 The addition of baseline condi-
tions without any opportunities to communicate also allows for insights with respect to
the conjecture that privileged groups enjoy higher quantities of the public good. The re-
sults indicate no such advantage. On the contrary, low-benet members contribute even
less when matched with a high-benet member, which reveals considerable inequality
1Examples for privileged groups include the international eorts to ght terrorism, where primary
targets such as the U.S. and the U.K. would still have an incentive to provide the funds needed even if
no other country had such an incentive. Scientic projects may share similar characteristics. Imagine,
e.g., a graduate student who needs a co-authored study to be completed for his Ph.D.
2This argument is consistent with experimental evidence conrming that the marginal per capita
return for providing the public good is a strong predictor of behavior (see, e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1979,
Isaac and Walker, 1988, Ledyard, 1995, Fisher et al., 1995).
3Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997) and Brandts and Schram (2001) allow for the \accidental" forma-
tion of privileged groups. Due to the information structure in these experiments, however, participants
were not aware what kind of group was formed in a given period.
4In fact, we are not aware of any public goods experiment that simultaneously allows for communica-
tion and asymmetric benets from cooperation.
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composition. Even messages from senders who benet disproportionally from cooperation
elicit substantial increases in contributions from low-benet members. This is also sur-
prising because the post experimental questionnaire reveals that high-benet members'
messages are suspected of serving selsh purposes.
What makes one-way communication eective? Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) em-
phasized the coordinative role of specic contribution suggestions. In this study, we test
an alternative explanation which focuses on the basic fact that communication enables
social interaction ex ante any binding decisions. This aspect is essential to some social
psychological explanation attempts as to why (multilateral) communication enhances co-
operation. Based on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), it is argued that
communication may create anity for the group and, hence, more cooperation (see, e.g.,
Orbell et al., 1988). Accordingly, well structured argumentation might not even be neces-
sary for communication to strengthen contributions, and \giving someone a voice" might
be sucient. We test this conjecture for one-way communication. Specically, we contrast
a baseline with two communication conditions, only one of which allows for messages re-
lated to the experimental game. Our results show that only game-relevant messages
may increase cooperation beyond the baseline condition. This nding is in accordance
with results from previous studies (Dawes et al., 1977, Bouas and Komorita, 1996) which
compared unrestricted multilateral communication to a condition that enabled discussion
about predened topics but not the dilemma situation itself.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimen-
tal design and procedures. Qualitative hypotheses are discussed in Section 3. Section 4
reports on the experimental results regarding contribution decisions, the communication
content, and the post experimental questionnaire. Section 5 summarizes the ndings and
concludes.
2 Experimental design
2.1 The basic public goods game
In all treatments, participants interact for a single period in a linear voluntary contribution
mechanism (see, e.g., Isaac et al., 1984). Every group consists of three members, i =
f1;2;3g, each of whom is endowed with E=25 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). All
4
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the public good. Every ECU a decision maker keeps is worth 1 ECU to him. Additionally,
he earns i ECU for every ECU he or any other group member contributes to the public
good. We refer to i as individual i's marginal per capita return (MPCR) or marginal
benet (from cooperation). Individual i's payo can be summarized by






j=1 cj is the sum of contributions in i's group.
Usually, public goods games are parameterized such that they satisfy 0 < i < 1;8i
and
P3
i=1 i > 1. The rst inequality implies that a monetary payo maximizing decision
maker has a dominant solution to contribute nothing, since he incurs a net loss of 1 i > 0
ECU for every ECU he contributes. However, due to the second inequality it is ecient
to contribute the entire endowment in the sense that it maximizes the sum of payos in
a group.
2.2 Experimental treatments
The experiment follows a 23 between subjects design. For the rst dimension we vary the
composition of the groups by introducing two types of players. A normal group consists
of three low-benet members, whose individual marginal benet from cooperation is equal
to L = 0:6. Privileged groups, in contrast, comprise two low-benet and one high-benet
member.5 The latter's MPCR is set to H = 1:6. Classication into player types takes
place at random. Note that this implementation of privileged groups mirrors that in
Reuben and Riedl (2009) and is consistent with the denition in the sense of Olson
(1965).6
For the second dimension we vary the available communication technology. The base-
line (or B) treatment oers no opportunity to communicate. In two further conditions,
we allow for one-way communication. We give one randomly chosen group member, i.e.,
the communicator, the opportunity to send a written message to his co-players prior to
the contribution decisions.7 In privileged groups, the communicator is also the high-
5In the experiment, high- and low-benet members were labeled A- and B-types, respectively.
6The only dierence compared to Reuben and Riedl (2009) is that in their setup, the types' MPCRs
are set to L = 0:5 and H = 1:5. This discrepancy is deliberate as we want to preserve the social
dilemma character of the decision situation also for the subsets of two low-benet members.
7In the following, we use the term \follower" to denote those group members who cannot communicate
in treatments which allow for one-way communication.
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communicators' contribution levels could not be identied. The two conditions allowing
communication dier only with respect to the permissible communication content. While
relevant one-way communication allows for messages that relate to the decision situation,
irrelevant one-way communication does not.8 The two treatments are abbreviated to RC
and IC, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the experimental treatments.
Table 1: Experimental treatments
Treatment Normal groups Privileged groups
(3 low-benet members) (1 high-, 2 low-benet members)












The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in June
and July 2011 in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics
in Jena, Germany. The participants were undergraduate students from the Friedrich
Schiller University Jena.9 They were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004).
Upon arrival, participants were seated at visually separated computer terminals. The
instructions were distributed and then read aloud to establish common knowledge.10 The
comprehension of the experimental rules was tested by means of a control questionnaire.
Any questions were answered privately at the participants' seats.
In both treatments allowing communication, the communicator had up to four minutes
to compose his message but was also able to nish ahead of time. The implementation
of relevant and irrelevant communication diered only with respect to the set of restric-
tions to the otherwise free-form messages. In both cases, the communicator was neither
allowed to violate anonymity, nor to promise side payments, nor to threaten the other
8The labels game-relevant and game-irrelevant would be more appropriate as we do not mean to
prejudge any treatment eects. The simplication is intended to serve readability and in accordance with
previous studies (Dawes et al., 1977, Bouas and Komorita, 1996).
9None of the subjects had previously participated in a public goods game experiment with communi-
cation opportunities.
10All instructions can be found in Appendix C.
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communication, the messages were additionally restricted to statements not relating to
the experiment.11 All messages were collected, screened by an experimenter and deliv-
ered simultaneously. If any restrictions were violated, the message was blocked and the
communicator was notied about his misconduct. Such an incident happened only once
in a normal group. It was common knowledge that (a) the messages were cheap talk
(i.e., costless, non-binding, and non-veriable), (b) all group members received exactly
the same message from the group's communicator, and (c) only after having read the com-
municator's message could the group members decide simultaneously on their individual
contributions.
The experimental procedure included four practice periods in which participants were
matched with computerized agents programmed to choose contributions randomly. In
treatments RC and IC, the practice periods did not include the communication stage. Af-
ter the experiment, all participants received information about the other group members'
individual contributions. Before the feedback was delivered, we distributed an unin-
centivized questionnaire, to elicit the subjects' identication with their group, rst order
action beliefs, and the followers' perception regarding the intention underlying the commu-
nicator's message.12;13 The questionnaire items' exact wording can be found in Appendix
A.
Sessions lasted 60 minutes on average. Payos were quoted in ECU, where 1 ECU =
20 euro cents. High- and low-benet group members earned on average 16.60 and 10.10
euro, respectively, including a 2.50 euro show-up fee.
11Implementing irrelevant communication in this way has the shortcoming that communicators may
try to circumvent the restriction, e.g., by using clever wording or metaphors. An alternative would be
to record the communicators' messages before distributing the instructions. While the latter method
precludes any reference to the specics of the public goods game, it does not entirely prevent the com-
municator from relating his message to the experiment. More specically, subjects experienced in exper-
imental paradigms such as the trust game might expect cooperation to be an important element of the
experiment. As communicators, they might then attempt to promote \full cooperation" even without
knowledge of the game and its parametrization.
12Since our main focus was on contribution decisions, we followed the advice in G achter and Renner
(2010) and elicited beliefs without payment.
13Delivering feedback after the questionnaire precluded the possibility that the participants' answers
were aected by statements about payos.
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3.1 No communication { baseline
Given preferences to maximize own monetary payos, group composition should not aect
behavior since both types of players have dominant strategies. A high-benet member
should contribute his whole endowment since he earns a net benet of 1:6   1 = 0:6
ECU for every ECU he contributes. A low-benet member, in contrast, is expected to
contribute nothing to the public good. Decades of experimental research, however, have
rejected the latter prediction (see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011) and it is thus reasonable to
expect some positive contributions also from low-benet members.
If we relax our assumptions and allow for preferences for equitable monetary outcomes,
the behavioral predictions change. Outcome-based models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) take into account that the privileged member benets dis-
proportionally from cooperation within the group. In fact, the only uniform contribution
decision by all group members which leads to strict equality in payos is when overall con-
tributions equal zero. Strictly positive contributions from low-benet types increase the
inequality in payos between the decision maker and the high-benet member by exactly
the same amount since H   L = 1. Notice that by the same argument, it is exclusively
the low-benet group members' contributions which generate payo discrepancies across
player types. A low-benet group member who is sensitive to the inequality in payos is
thus predicted to contribute less in privileged than in normal groups.
In both, normal and privileged groups, a contribution always benets the group more
than it costs the contributor. The aggregate eect on overall payos, however, diers
according to group composition. While a contribution of 1 ECU generates a total payo
of 3  0:6 = 1:8 ECU in normal groups, this gure amounts to 2  0:6 + 1:6 = 2:8
ECU in privileged groups. This discrepancy might lead to dierences in behavior if
participants' choices are guided by concerns for overall eciency (see, e.g., Engelmann
and Strobel, 2004). While a preference for overall eciency coincides with monetary
payo maximization for high-benet types, it counteracts the incentive to free ride for
low-benet members.
In summary, it can be said that high-benet members are expected to contribute their
whole endowment under monetary payo maximization. Neither inequality aversion nor
a preference for eciency contradict this prediction. We propose our rst hypothesis:
8
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Both, maximization of the own monetary payo and preferences for equality in payos,
predict lower contributions from low- than from high-benet types, leading to Hypothesis
2:
Hypothesis 2. High-benet group members contribute more than low-benet members.
It is not straight-forward how the composition of groups will aect low-benet types.
Preferences for eciency suggest higher contributions, while preferences for equality sug-
gest lower contributions in privileged than in normal groups. While, strictly speaking,
we are not in a position to propose a precise behavioral hypothesis ex ante, the observed
behavior will help us to make an inference about the relative strength of the opposing
eects ex post.
3.2 One-way communication
In social dilemma experiments, participants seize communication opportunities usually
in an attempt to mitigate the free rider problem. In our setup, however, high-benet
members are essentially unproblematic since they themselves have an incentive to provide
the public good. As a consequence, neither relevant nor irrelevant one-way communication
are expected to change the behavior of high-benet members.
Hypothesis 3. High-benet group members contribute their entire endowment irrespec-
tive of any communication opportunities.
Since high-benet types should remain unaected, we exclusively concentrate on the
low-benet types when discussing the potential eects of one-way communication.
3.2.1 Relevant communication
If we assume common knowledge of rationality and preferences to maximize monetary out-
comes, then costless, non-binding and non-veriable messages are, of course, pure cheap
talk. Consequently, they should not aect the behavior of low-benet members. However,
previous studies on (relevant) one-way communication in normal groups have rejected this
prediction. Even for the case in which subjects interact for a single period, relevant one-
way messages have a strong and positive eect on overall cooperation (Koukoumelis et al.,
2012). Since our setup is dierent from theirs only with respect to the parametrization
of the public goods game, we expect to replicate the eect for normal groups.
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munication than with no communication.
Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) observe that the majority of messages contain specic
contribution suggestions, which mostly point to full cooperation, and that these sugges-
tions are followed by the majority of participants. The authors conjecture that messages
function as a coordination device, which is plausible as, e.g., preferences for conditional
cooperation can transform the social dilemma into a coordination game with multiple
Pareto-ranked equilibria (see, e.g., Sen, 1967, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).14 It is also
consistent with a stream of literature in social psychology (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978,
Kelley, 1979) which argues that the (experimentally) \given" payo matrix might diverge
from the \eective" matrix. Or, as the sociologist Peter Kollock (1998, p. 193) put it:
\There is, after all, no guarantee that subjects play an experimental game as intended by
the researcher ...."
There is little reason to expect that high-benet communicators will be less likely than
low-benet communicators to try and promote high cooperation. After all, they have an
even greater interest to do so, as they benet disproportionally from the public good.
Whether they are similarly successful will depend on the desirability of high cooperation
for low-benet types in privileged groups. Assume, for instance, that a communicator
suggests full cooperation. Unanimous compliance with such a suggestion would lead to
higher overall payos in privileged than in normal groups. The distribution of payos,
however, would be equal in normal and maximally unequal in privileged groups since
the total surplus is solely earned by the high-benet communicator. Thus, if low-benet
types strive for eciency, their compliance with high contribution suggestions might be
high also in privileged groups. Compliance and thus the cooperation-enhancing eect of
one-way communication might seriously suer, though, if low-benet types dislike payo
inequalities.
Contribution suggestions by communicators are not only cheap talk but may also
exhibit some self-serving character. If a communicator believes (with positive probability)
that high contribution suggestions will, on average, lead to higher contributions, he will
always try to promote cooperation. While this is true for both types of groups, the self-
serving character of contribution suggestions seems intuitively more salient in the case
of asymmetric marginal benets, where communicators are also the main beneciaries of
14According to Fischbacher et al. (2001) conditional cooperation can either be viewed as a consequence
of, e.g., fairness motives or as a preference in itself.
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for reciprocal action (see, e.g., McCabe et al., 2003, Falk et al., 2008). We are not aware
of a similar result which connects the eectiveness of communication to the perceived
intention underlying the communication content. If such a relationship exists, however, a
higher saliency of selsh intentions is likely to lead to lower compliance with suggestions
to cooperate.
Depending on the desirability of eciency or payo equality and the sensitivity to
perceived intentions, one-way communication, or, more precisely, specic contribution
suggestions, might be more or less eective in privileged vis- a-vis normal groups. We
suspect that the net eect will be correlated with how behavior of low-benet members
compares across both types of groups. Lower cooperation in the presence of the high-
benet member, for instance, would signal inequality aversion, which should weaken the
eectiveness of one-way communication.
3.2.2 Irrelevant communication
It has been a long-standing conjecture in social psychology that communication aects
cooperation in social dilemmas by manipulating the social environment (see, e.g., Orbell
et al., 1988). The same may be true for one-way communication. By sending their
message, communicators might create an environment in which participants perceive their
group no longer as anonymous and randomly assembled but rather as a social entity bound
together by fate. Research in sociology and social psychology suggests that even arbitrary
categorization can lead to higher cooperation in social dilemmas (see, e.g., Simpson, 2006,
Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008). Thus, it might not be necessary that the communicators'
messages relate to the experimental game for one-way communication to be eciency-
enhancing. \Giving one group member a voice" might be sucient to elicit identication
with the group and enhance cooperation. This line of reasoning is equally applicable to
normal as well as privileged groups and suggests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. Irrelevant one-way communication, i.e., messages unrelated to the exper-
imental game, leads to higher cooperation than no communication.
Previous empirical ndings cast doubt on the validity of this hypothesis. In two
separate experiments, Dawes et al. (1977) as well as Bouas and Komorita (1996) nd
that even irrelevant multilateral communication (i.e., communication among all group
members on a topic other than the experiment) does not lead to higher cooperation rates
11
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promote cooperation, it is doubtful that giving only one person a voice will.
4 Results
We conducted one session per treatment with 30 participants each. The data analysis
is based on 10 group averages per treatment since communication allows for correlated
decisions within groups.15 Consequently, data is also averaged by group for analysis on a
more disaggregate level, i.e., for low-benet members or followers. Unless stated otherwise,
we will use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests for comparisons across treatments and
two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests to compare matched pairs within treatments.16 We
rst investigate contribution decisions. Afterward, we advance to the analysis of the
communication content and the data from the post experimental questionnaire.
4.1 Contribution decisions
Figure 1, panel a, depicts the average group contributions in normal groups for all three
conditions. In the baseline, average contributions amount to 12 ECU, or almost half the
endowment. This is consistent with previous ndings (see, e.g., Ostrom, 2000). Rele-
vant and irrelevant one-way communication elicit average contributions of 19.2 and 9.5
ECU, respectively. We thus nd support for Hypothesis 4 but not for Hypothesis 5 since
only relevant one-way communication seems to lead to an increase in cooperation. Non-
parametric tests conrm this impression. While relevant messages lead to signicantly
higher contributions both with respect to the baseline (p = 0:01) and irrelevant messages
(p = 0:004), the latter two conditions show no signicant dierences (p = 0:44). More-
over, the same result holds if we exclude the communicators' decisions (p = 0:02, B vs.
RC; p = 0:65, B vs. IC; p = 0:02, RC vs. IC).
The general picture for privileged groups, which is depicted in panel b of Figure 1,
is qualitatively similar to that of normal groups. It is again relevant communication
which elicits the highest average contributions, namely 16.8 ECU. The relative advan-
tage with respect to the baseline and irrelevant communication, however, seems smaller
15In case of irrelevant communication, we exclude the group for which the message was blocked from
our entire analysis. All results are robust to its inclusion.
16The null hypothesis of a Wilcoxon rank sum test states that both independent samples are drawn
from the same population. A Wilcoxon signed rank test requires for any observation in one sample a
unique counterpart in the paired sample. It tests the null hypothesis that the dierence in medians
between the samples is equal to zero.
12






























































baseline relevant communication irrelevant communication
Figure 1: Average group contributions and 95% condence intervals
than in normal groups as contributions in the latter two conditions average 12.6 and 13.6
ECU, respectively. The null hypothesis of equality in distributions is rejected on the 10%
signicance level only for the comparison between relevant communication and the base-
line condition (p = 0:053). No other pairwise comparison reveals a signicant dierence
(p = 0:16, RC vs. IC; p = 0:82, B vs. IC). We summarize with Result 1.
Result 1. We conrm that relevant one-way communication elicits higher average coop-
eration than no communication in a public goods game with normal groups. The eect
also proves to be robust in privileged groups. The eciency-enhancing eect of one-way
communication is, however, conned to (game-)relevant messages. Merely \giving one
group member a voice" does not suce for one-way communication to increase coop-
eration. We do (do not) nd signicant dierences between the eects of relevant and
irrelevant messages in normal (privileged) groups.
In order to assess the alleged advantage of privileged over normal groups, we compare
the contributions across the two panels of Figure 1. While average contributions are
virtually identical in the two baseline conditions, contributions are higher in normal than
in privileged groups when relevant communication is allowed. This relation is reversed
when we consider irrelevant communication. Pairwise comparisons, however, fail to reject
the null hypothesis of equality in distributions for all three conditions (p = 0:97 for B;
p = 0:18 for RC; p = 0:22 for IC). We summarize with Result 2.
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one-way communication, we do not nd support for the claim that contributions are higher
in privileged than in normal groups.
Both, results 1 and 2, have to be treated cautiously, as average group contributions
may mask considerable heterogeneity in behavior across dierent player types. Figure 2
depicts type-specic contributions, where those of low-benet members represent group
averages.17 Let us consider high- and low-benet members in privileged groups. Hypothe-
ses 1 and 3 hold that high-benet members contribute their entire endowment irrespective
of any communication opportunities. Low-benet types are expected to contribute sig-
nicantly less (see Hypothesis 2) but might be aected by one-way communication. Our
data lends support to these conjectures. High-benet members contribute, on average,
between 88% and 98% of their endowment. In fact, 24 out of 30 individual observa-
tions are exactly equal to the full endowment. Two-sided t-tests do not detect a location
shift away from 25 ECU in any of the conditions (p = 0:12 for the B, p = 0:26 for RC,
p = 0:34 for IC). Furthermore, pairwise comparisons fail to reject the null hypothesis
of equal distributions across conditions with and without communication opportunities
(smallest p-value: p = 0:28 for RC). While high-benet group members' contributions are
very close to full eciency, the contributions from low-benet members fall short of that
mark. On average, they contribute 29%, 56.8%, and 32.6% of their endowment in treat-
ments B, RC, and IC, respectively. Comparing contributions between the dierent player
types, the null hypothesis is rejected on the 1% signicance level for both treatments B
and IC (both p = 0:005) and on the 10% level for treatment RC (p = 0:08). Unlike high-
benet members' decisions, those of low-benet members are sensitive to the availability
of communication opportunities. This is already visible on the group level and becomes
even more evident on the individual level, where the ecient contribution is observed
only once in each treatment B and IC but nine times in treatment RC. Pairwise com-
parisons of low-benet types' contributions reveal that relevant one-way messages lead
to higher cooperation than the baseline treatment, though irrelevant messages do not
(p = 0:04, B vs. RC; p = 0:97, B vs. IC). As for relevant communication, contributions
are marginally signicantly higher than for irrelevant communication (p = 0:095). Figure
2 also suggests that relevant messages lead to similar increases in low-benet members'
contributions in both types of groups. These ndings qualify Result 1 and show that
17The bars for normal groups are identical to those in panel a of Figure 1, since normal groups exclu-
sively consist of low-benet members.
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to higher contributions by low-benet members. We summarize with Result 3.
Result 3. In privileged groups, behavior is type specic. High-benet group members con-
tribute almost their entire endowment irrespective of any communication opportunities.
Low-benet members contribute signicantly less than high-benet members, unless rel-
evant one-way messages are possible. Relevant one-way communication aects low- but
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Figure 2: Type-specic contributions and 95% condence intervals
Result 2 does not support the presupposed advantage for privileged groups but, ac-
cording to Result 3, this is not due to the lack of contributions from high-benet members.
It is thus of interest to compare the behavior of low-benet members across the dierent
types of groups. Figure 2 shows that low-benet members' contributions are lower in
privileged groups for all three treatments. The discrepancy between privileged and nor-
mal groups is more pronounced in treatments B (4.7 ECU) and RC (5.0 ECU) than in
treatment IC (1.5 ECU). Pairwise comparisons reveal that the dierence is signicant in
the baseline treatment (p = 0:03), weakly signicant with relevant messages (p = 0:09),
and far from being signicant with irrelevant messages (p = 0:57). We summarize with
Result 4.
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high-benet member as contributions tend to be lower in privileged than in normal groups
when communication opportunities are either absent or relevant messages are allowed.
This result deserves some discussion. First, note that Reuben and Riedl (2009) do not
nd that low-benet members' decisions are sensitive to group composition. This discrep-
ancy might be explained by their choice of a repeated partners design which allows for
reputation building. The opportunity to act strategically might induce low-benet mem-
bers to cooperate even if they dislike payo inequalities. Gl ockner et al. (2011) report that
the presence of a high-benet member deters cooperation of low-benet members but only
after a restart following ten initial periods. Our result is complementary as it shows that
this eect does not rely on long sequences of repetitions. Result 4 is also informative with
respect to the eectiveness of relevant one-way communication in privileged groups. It
demonstrates that low-benet types' contribution decisions are sensitive to payo inequal-
ities. We argue in Section 3 that such sensitivity could weaken the cooperation-enhancing
eect of one-way communication in privileged groups. Results 1 and 3, however, show
that relevant one-way messages are similarly eective in both types of groups. One pos-
sible explanation is that eciency concerns, when voiced by the communicator, become
increasingly important in the decision process. We discuss this in more detail in Section
4.2.
Results 1 through 3 showed that relevant one-way communication yields an increase in
contributions to the public good irrespective of group composition. But who benets from
this increase in cooperation? In order to answer this question, we investigate participants'
payos which are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Payos by treatment and player type
Treatment Average
Communicator / Follower /
high-benet low-benet
B 9.46 { 9.46
Normal groups RC 10.66 10.64 10.67
IC 9.08 9.67 8.79
B 12.09 14.99 10.64
Privileged groups RC 13.61 19.27 10.78
IC 12.42 15.67 10.79
Note: Payos are denoted in Euro and include the 2.50 euro show-up fee.
In normal groups, group-averaged payos are signicantly higher in treatment RC than
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and, to a minor extent, also communicators. While followers in RC earn signicantly more
than both followers in IC and participants in the baseline treatment (both p < 0:02), the
respective comparisons are weakly signicant (p = 0:07) and insignicant (p = 0:18) for
communicators.
In privileged groups, the increase in average earnings associated with relevant one-
way communication is less pronounced. In particular, average payos are only weakly
signicantly higher in treatment RC than in B and not signicantly dierent for all other
pairwise comparisons (p = 0:054, B vs. RC, p = 0:82, B vs. IC, p = 0:16, RC vs.
IC). Since high-benet members benet disproportionally from the public good, it is
not surprising that they earn signicantly more than low-benet members in all three
treatments (all p < 0:01). A comparison between treatments, however, also reveals that
high-benet members are the only beneciaries of the opportunity to send (game-)relevant
messages. While low-benet members in privileged groups earn virtually the same in all
three treatments (all p > 0:12), high-benet members earn signicantly more in treatment
RC than in the baseline (p = 0:04).18 In fact, while the average earnings dierential
between player types amounts to 4.35 and 4.88 euro in B and IC, respectively, it roughly
doubles to 8.49 euro in treatment RC.19
4.2 Communication content
We categorize the messages in the treatment RC according to the scheme described in
Table 3. All methodological details can be found in Appendix B. Table 4 reports the
categories' relative frequencies of appearance in the messages' argumentation.
On average, a message entails arguments according to 4.8 and 4.2 categories in normal
and privileged groups, respectively. We treat this as a sign that most communicators took
their task seriously, trying to make an impact with their messages. In many respects, the
messages are very similar in both types of groups. In normal as well as privileged groups,
the majority of messages incorporates suggestions for concrete (category 1) and ecient
(category 2) contributions coupled with an emphasis on the importance of conformity
within the group (category 3).20 Statements pointing to fairness (category 7) or team
18No other pairwise comparison for high-benet members reveals signicant dierences (p = 0:93, B
vs. IC; p = 0:11, RC vs. IC).
19The earnings dierential between high- and low-benet members is signicantly larger in RC than
in B (p = 0:04), weakly signicantly so in RC than in IC (p = 0:096), and not dierent for B and IC
(p = 0:97).
20While this is in accordance with the results for treatment C in Koukoumelis et al. (2012), note that
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the contribution suggestions, are less frequent but present for both types of groups.21
Half of all communicators signal their contribution intentions (category 9). Most of them
specically promise to contribute their entire endowment. Note that such a promise is
credible in privileged groups, as communicators are high-benet members, but not in
normal groups.
Apart from these similarities there are some noticeable dierences in the messages'
content between the dierent types of groups. In fact, comparing the distributions of
arguments between types of groups, a one-sided Fisher exact test gives some indication
that the distribution of category appearance depends on group composition (p = 0:07).
Most strikingly, we observe payo calculations for seven out of ten normal groups but
only for one privileged group. This dierence is signicant according to a two-sided
Fisher exact test (p = 0:02). One rationalization for this observation might be that
payo calculations facilitate the demonstration of possible gains from cooperation but,
at the same time, may also highlight the salience of payo inequalities. High-benet
communicators might thus avoid computations altogether if they expect low-benet types
to be inequality averse. Instead, they might try to point out the possibility of eciency
gains in dierent ways, which is what we observe. Six high-benet communicators mention
group payo maximization (category 5) { twice as many as in normal groups. This
dierence is, however, not signicant (p = 0:37, two-sided Fisher exact test).
We have not categorized messages in treatment IC since they tend to be very heteroge-
nous in their content. Many of them include only one \argument," if any. Three messages,
for instance, merely incorporate the wish that the other group members may enjoy the
experiment. Other messages just consist of nursery rhymes. Four messages are seemingly
intended to entertain the receivers as they contain a joke or humorous summary of the
daily news. The only message that was blocked referred to the upcoming contribution
decision and the possible payos.22 Perhaps most rich in content, six messages relate to
general fairness ideas (\love your neighbor as yourself," \harm set, harm get") or invoke
solidarity principles (three senders mention the slogan of Dumas' musketeers \one for all,
the relative frequency of suggestions is somewhat lower in the present study.
21Statements which relate to satisfaction (category 7) are absent in normal as well as privileged groups.
We incorporate thie category in order to facilitate comparison with the results in Koukoumelis et al. (2010,
2012).
22We observe only one obvious attempt to circumvent the restrictions and still hint to to some desired
contribution level. The sender of this message fabricates a story and mentions the number 25 wherever
possible, but he never relates to the experiment. The average contribution from low-benet members in
that particular privileged group is 7.5 ECU.
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1 Suggestion 0.8 0.7
2 Ecient suggestion 0.7 0.6
3 Conformity 0.9 0.6
4 Payo calculation 0.7 0.1
5 Group payo maximization 0.3 0.6
6 Satisfaction 0 0
7 Fairness 0.3 0.1
8 Team spirit 0.3 0.4
9 Promise 0.4 0.6
Note: The relative frequencies are based on 10 observations for each type
of group.
all for one").
4.3 Post experimental questionnaire
4.3.1 Group identication
Some studies in social psychology argue that the eects of communication are driven by
enhanced group identication. If this was the case, we should expect group members to
identify more with their group in treatment RC than in the baseline. The ineectiveness
of irrelevant one-way communication, in turn, might be explained by the lack of such an
increase in identication. The data from the post experimental questionnaire permits us
to investigate these conjectures. We calculate a participant's mean identication score as
his average response to all four items. Comparing group averages across treatments, we
nd for normal groups that identication is indeed weakly signicantly higher in RC than
B (p = 0:06) and not signicantly dierent otherwise (p = 0:97, B vs. IC; p = 0:12, RC
vs. IC). This result proves robust if we focus on group averages of non-communicators
(p = 0:096, B vs. RC; p = 0:73, B vs. IC; p = 0:32, RC vs. IC). The data from normal
groups is thus not inconsistent with previous conjectures.
The picture changes when we consider privileged groups. While, on the group level,
mean identication scores are weakly signicantly higher in RC than in the baseline
(p = 0:06), this is not the case for low-benet members (p = 0:21). Since it is precisely
the low-benet members who react to relevant communication in privileged groups, the
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group identication. A further puzzling observation is that irrelevant one-way messages
lead to signicantly higher identication than the baseline for group averages as well as for
averages of low-benet members (p = 0:02 and p = 0:03, respectively).23 If communication
was to aect cooperation via group identication, we should observe higher contributions
in IC than in the baseline for privileged groups. The fact that we do not, casts doubt
on the conjectured link between (higher) identication and enhanced cooperation. It is
thus also possible that the increased identication in treatment RC for normal groups is a
by-product rather the driving force behind the eectiveness of relevant one-way messages.
4.3.2 Message perception
In treatment RC, the majority of communicators makes specic contribution suggestions.
Although these may always be interpreted as serving the communicator's monetary inter-
est, we conjectured in Section 3 that such an interpretation was more likely in privileged
groups, where the incentive structure highlights the communicator's interest in the public
good. We also surmised that the perception that a suggestion serves a selsh purpose
might reduce the rate of compliance. Result 3 shows, however, that relevant messages
increase the cooperation of low-benet members also in privileged groups. The ques-
tion arises whether this is due to the fact that followers are unaware of the messages'
potentially selsh character or that this property is unimportant for their decisions.
The questionnaire data (cf. item 9, Appendix A) might help to shed light on this
question. Followers had to rate their degree of consent to a statement portraying the
message they received as intended to maximize the communicator's own payos. The data
shows that followers (averaged by group) have a signicantly higher tendency to agree with
this statement in privileged than in normal groups (p = 0:001).24 Since it is not the lack of
awareness, followers' choices must be insensitive with respect to perceived selsh purpose
of messages. And indeed, the correlation between average follower contributions and
their average responses to this questionnaire item turns out to be virtually zero ( = 0:02,
p = 0:97). This insight is somewhat surprising as we know that perceived intentions are a
crucial determinant of reciprocity (Falk et al., 2008). Despite the obvious discrepancy that
the latter result deals with reactions to actions and not written statements, both situations
23For privileged groups, identication is not dierent for treatments RC and IC, neither for group
averages nor for averages of low-benet members.
24This is not the case for irrelevant messages (p = 0:73).
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some agents' willingness to react to one agent's attempt to stimulate cooperation.
4.3.3 Expected contributions
In Section 3 and in previous studies (Koukoumelis et al., 2010, 2012), we have argued that
relevant one-way messages, and, more specically, contribution suggestions may serve as
a coordination device. This concept assigns a critical role to expectations as suggestions
supposedly aect prior beliefs about what to expect from other group members. Condi-
tional cooperators should be sensitive to such changes in expectations. The questionnaire
data reported in Table 5 provides some support for these conjectures.25 On the group
level, average expectations proof to be signicantly higher in treatment RC than in the
baseline for both types of groups (both p = 0:01). Irrelevant messages, on the other
hand, do not signicantly aect average expectations compared to the baseline treatment
(p > 0:41, for both types of groups).26 Interestingly, we do not nd signicant dif-
Table 5: Expected contributions by treatment and player type
Treatment Average




B 12.4 { { 12.4
Normal groups RC 18.1 16.2 { 19.1
IC 11 8.2 { 12.4
B 12.1 9.5 19.3 7.5
Privileged groups RC 15.4 11.4 23.6 11.1
IC 13.4 11.2 21.4 7.6
Note: In order to obtain one (average) measure per privileged group, we rst calculate a low-benet
member's average expectation as the mean of what he expects from both his peers. Then, we average
the expectations of all three group members.
ferences between expectations of communicators in treatment RC and those of average
participants in the baseline treatment (p = 0:59) for normal groups. The same holds for
high-benet members' expectations in treatments RC and B (p = 0:29).27 This result
25Cf. items 5 to 8 in Appendix A.
26Relevant messages elicit signicantly higher average expectations than irrelevant ones only in normal
but not in privileged groups (p = 0:01 and p = 0:16, respectively).
27Communicators of normal groups report signicantly lower expectations for treatment IC than com-
municators in RC or the average member in the baseline (p = 0:02 and p = 0:048, respectively). There
are no signicant dierences in expectations for high-benet members for any combination of treatments
(p > 0:29, for all cases).
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their messages would enhance cooperation. Instead, it is followers who trust in the eec-
tiveness of relevant one-way messages. In normal groups, they report signicantly higher
expectations in treatment RC than the average member in the baseline and followers
in treatment IC (both p < 0:01). In privileged groups, this tendency is less marked as
low-benet members' expectations about the other low-benet member's action are only
weakly signicantly higher in treatment RC than in the baseline and not signicantly
dierent otherwise (p = 0:095, B vs. RC; p = 0:88, B vs. IC; p = 0:12, RC vs. IC). Sur-
prisingly, however, their expectations about high-benet members are aected by relevant
messages (p = 0:01, B vs. RC; p = 0:21, B vs. IC; p = 0:16, RC vs. IC).28 This indicates
that enhanced cooperation of low-benet members in treatment RC might partially be
due to a conditionally cooperative reaction to a falsely assumed (cf. Result 3) increase
in contributions from high-benet members. In summary, the belief data suggests that
relevant but not irrelevant one-way communication generates more optimistic expecta-
tions about others' contributions. Most astonishingly, this eect is exclusively visible for
followers.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we use a one-shot public goods game to investigate contribution behavior
in privileged vis- a-vis normal groups with and without one-way communication. The
contribution to the literature is three-fold.
First, we provide evidence that contribution behavior can be inversely related to other
group members' marginal benets from the public good when interaction is one-shot.
While eciency concerns would predict the opposite, the result is in accordance with
fairness theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) which account for
payo inequalities resulting from asymmetric marginal benets. The lack of personal sac-
rice in contributions from high-benet members constitutes an alternative explanation
(Gl ockner et al., 2011). If personal sacrice is dened dichotomously, a future experiment
might succeed in distinguishing these two explanations by comparing normal and privi-
leged groups to intermediate groups, in which marginal benets are asymmetric but the
dominance of free riding is preserved. Our results have implications for the alleged advan-
28Separate t-tests reject the null hypothesis that followers expected high-benet members to contribute
the entire endowment for all three treatments (p < 0:02, for all cases).
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good in privileged compared to normal groups depends on two opposing eects. The rst
eect is that high-benet members contribute higher amounts than low-benet members
in normal groups. The other is that the presence of a high-benet member inhibits co-
operation by low-benet members. Which of these eects dominates might depend on
group composition. When they have many low- and few high-benet members, privileged
groups might even enjoy lower quantities of the public good than normal groups.
Second, we conrm that one-way communication yields enhanced cooperation even
if a sender of the message benets disproportionally from the public good. Followers
comply with communicators' persuasion attempts (1) despite their awareness that these
might be based on self-serving intentions rather than a desire to benet the group and
(2) despite the fact that such behavior inevitably yields unfavorable payo inequality
for themselves. The rst aspect suggests that, in contrast to reciprocity with respect to
actions, compliance with contribution suggestions does not depend on perceived inten-
tions. The second aspect indicates that followers accept payo inequalities more readily
when one-way communication is available. One possible explanation for this observation
is that communicators' arguments increase the weight of eciency considerations in the
decision making process. Overall, our experimental evidence makes a compelling case for
the robustness of the eectiveness of one-way communication. This property should not
be taken for granted, however. Reuben and Riedl (2009) have already shown that even
the power of punishment opportunities tumbles in privileged groups.
Third, we test and reject the conjecture that one-way communication aects cooper-
ation merely by \giving someone a voice." Messages which are restricted to topics other
than the experiment do not aect contribution decisions irrespective of group compo-
sition. This result implies that the mechanism underlying the eectiveness of one-way
messages resides within the communication content.
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A Post experimental questionnaire
For items 1 to 4 and item 9, participants were asked to state their degree of agreement
(\not at all" to \very much") on a 7-point Likert scale. All other items asked for an
integer input between 0 and 10. Belief elicitation was tailored with respect to the player
type indicated in italics after items 5 to 8. Except for the rst four items which measured
group identication, every item appeared on a separate screen. Originally, all items were
in German.
1. I feel committed to my group.
2. I am glad to be in my group.
3. I feel solidarity with my group.
4. It is pleasant to be in my group.
5. According to your estimation, what is the other group members' average contribu-
tion to the project? (normal groups)
6. According to your estimation, what did the two members of type B contribute on
average to the project? (high-benet members)
7. According to your estimation, what did the member of type A contribute to the
project? (low-benet members in privileged groups)
8. According to your estimation, what did the other member of type B contribute to
the project? (low-benet members in privileged groups)
9. The communicator's message was constructed as to maximize his own payo. (non-
communicators)
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Our categorization methodology follows Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter and Strass-
mair (2009). The set of categories is based on those obtained for treatment C in Kouk-
oumelis et al. (2012). The new messages were screened in order to identify potentially
distinct arguments, which were not represented in the original set of categories. Since
none were found, we adopt the previous set of categories and report it in Table 3. For
an exact description of how the original categories where established, see Appendix A in
Koukoumelis et al. (2012).
Two undergraduate research assistants separately coded all messages obtained from
treatment RC. If one message contained the argument(s) specied by a category, then
that category was assigned the value of 1 (otherwise, it was assigned the value of 0). The
correlation coecient between the assistants' codings was 0.64 and 0.85 for the sets of
normal and privileged groups, respectively. Finally, the two coders gathered and discussed
their individual assessments and arrived at a common coding. The result is reported in
Table 4.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for all treatments. Those for
normal groups in the baseline treatment are displayed in full length below. They contain
all parts which are common to all six treatments. The instructions for privileged groups
and the treatments RC and IC can be obtained by inserting and replacing the appropriate
paragraphs. The place holder [for <treatment name>, replace the following paragraph]
indicates which paragraphs have to be replaced, where the replacement always has the
same heading. The place holder [for <treatment name>, insert paragraph <paragraph
name> here] prescribes where new paragraphs have to be inserted.
C.1 Instructions for normal groups - baseline treatment
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max Planck
Institute of Economics. Please remain silent and switch o your mobile.
You will receive e2.50 for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn more money.
In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The e2.50 show-up fee and
any additional amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of
the experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e., without the other participants
knowing the extent of your earnings. During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros
but of ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). ECUs are converted to euros at the following
exchange rate: 1 ECU = e0:20.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions during
the experiment please raise your hand.
Detailed information on the experiment
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of three players. You will never learn the identity of the
other members of your group.
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The experiment consists of one period only. In this period, you (as well as the other
members of your group) receive an endowment of 25 ECUs. You have to decide how many
of these 25 ECUs you want to contribute to a project. The ECUs contributed to
the project yield income for you as well as for the other members of your group (you will
learn more about the \income from the project" below). You can keep the ECUs that
you do not contribute for yourself.
[for privileged groups, replace the following paragraph]
Period-earnings
More specically, your period-earnings consist of two parts:
a) \Income from the project" = 0.6  sum of all group members' contributions (in
words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the sum of the
contributions of all group members by 0.6);
b) \ECUs you keep" = 25   your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0:6  sum of group's contributions) + (10   your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then both you and your group
members receive an \income from the project" of 9 ECUs (= 0.6  15). The \ECUs you
keep" are 20 (= 25   5). Hence, your period-earnings are 9 + 20 = 29 ECUs.
[for treatments IC and RC, replace the following paragraph]
Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other two members of your group decide simultaneously and privately
about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
[for treatments IC and RC, insert paragraph Communication here]
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You will receive information about 1) the number of ECU contributed by each of your
group members, with the individual contributions being sorted in descending order, 2)
the income from the project, and 3) your corresponding period-earnings.
Your nal payo
At the end of the experiment, your period-earnings will be converted into euros and paid
out to you in cash, together with the show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to verify
your understanding of the rules of the experiment. Once everybody has answered all
questions correctly, four practice periods will be played (only for treatments IC and RC:),
which will only include the decision situation, but not the communication stage. During
these four practice periods, you will not be matched with other persons in this room,
but with a computer that will determine the others' decisions randomly. You will get no
payment for these practice periods.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now.
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Communication
During the communication stage the communicator can use his/her keyboard to type
one message to the others. The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes,
(only for relevant communication:), including what (s)he thinks is the best approach to
the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what (s)he would like the others to do. (Only
for irrelevant communication:). Its content may e.g. be related to a current topic or may
be intended to entertain the other group members.
However, there are two (only for irrelevant communication:) three restrictions on the
kind of messages that the communicator can send:
1. The communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the others. Thus, (s)he
cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other identifying feature such
as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. There must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything that is to occur
after the experiment.
3. (Only for irrelevant communication:) Third, the communicator is not allowed to
write about the upcoming decision situation. Thus, (s)he, e.g., must not indicate
what (s)he thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or
what (s)he would like the others to do.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being sent, are
checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper messages are not
delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free to send
it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining time.
The screen-shots that you will see if you are the communicator in your group are
shown below.
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Period-earnings
More specically, your period-earnings consist of two parts:
a) \Income from the project" = type-factor  sum of all group members' contribu-
tions (in words, your income from the project is determined by multiplying the sum
of the contributions of all group members by your type-factor);
b) \ECUs you keep" = 25   your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECUs you keep
(type-factor  sum of group's contributions) + (25   your contribution)
Before the experiment starts, you will be randomly assigned to either of two types: type
A or type B. Each group consists of one member of type A and two members of type B.
The types dier exclusively in their \income from the project." More specically:
 If you are of type A, your type-factor is 1.6.
 If you are of type B, your type-factor is 0.6.
(Only for the baseline condition:) At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each
group is randomly selected to be the \type A member." Every participant will be informed
whether he or she is going to act as the \type A member" in an \Information Window."
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then the \ECUs you keep" are
20 (= 25   5) for both you and for your group members. The \income from the project"
is 24 ECU (= 1.6  15) if you are of type A and 9 ECU (= 0.6  15) if you are of type
B. Hence, your period earnings are 24 + 20 = 44 ECUs if you are of type A and 9 + 20
= 29 ECUs if you are of type B.
Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other two members of your group decide simultaneously and privately
about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
Before making your contribution decision, the type A member of every group is given
the opportunity to communicate with his/her fellow members (how communication is
carried out is described below). In the following, we shall refer to the type A member
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At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly selected
to be the \type A member / communicator." Every participant will be informed whether
he or she is going to act as the \type A member / communicator" in an \Information
Window."
Communication
During the communication stage the communicator can use his/her keyboard to type
one message to the others. The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes
(only for relevant communication:), including what (s)he thinks is the best approach to
the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what (s)he would like the others to do. (Only
for irrelevant communication:). Its content may e.g. be related to a current topic or may
be intended to entertain the other group members.
However, there are two (only for irrelevant communication:) three restrictions on the
kind of messages that the communicator can send:
1. The communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the others. Thus, (s)he
cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other identifying feature such
as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. There must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything that is to occur
after the experiment.
3. (Only for irrelevant communication:) The communicator is not allowed to write
about the upcoming decision situation. Thus, (s)he, e.g., must not indicate what
(s)he thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being sent, are
checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper messages are not
delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free to send
it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining time.
The screen-shots that you will see if you are the communicator in your group are
shown below.
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